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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. 
RODOLFO SOTOLONGO : Case No. 20020528-CA 
Defendant/Appellant ; 
INTRODUCTION 
In sentencing criminal defendants, trial courts must consider the sentences given to 
co-defendants and state on the record the reasons for treating defendants differently. 
Where, as here, the defendant is less culpable than his co-defendant, fairness demands 
that the trial court explain why Mr. Sotolongo was treated more harshly. Contrary to the 
State's representations, Utah courts have not addressed this issue and there is no majority 
position rejecting consideration of a co-defendant's sentence. In fact, most of the cases 
the State cites agree that a co-defendant's sentence is a relevant sentencing factor. 
Although the trial judge may have been aware that the co-defendant received a jail 
sentence and probation, the judge appears to have rejected the co-defendant's sentence as 
a relevant consideration. This failure was an abuse of discretion and requires a new 
sentencing hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
FAIRNESS AND UNIFORMITY REQUIRE 
SENTENCING JUDGES TO CONSIDER CO-
DEFENDANTS1 SENTENCES AND THE RELATIVE 
CULPABILITY OF THE ACTORS 
Mr. Sotolongo requests this Court to order sentencing judges to include a co-
defendant's sentence among the "legally relevant factors" that trial courts must consider 
in sentencing. State v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). Basic notions of 
fairness mandate that a co-defendant's sentence is a legally relevant factor. "'[G]revious 
inequities in sentencing destroy a prisoner's sense of having been justly dealt with, as 
well as the public's confidence in the even-handed justice of our [criminal justice] 
system.'" State v. Roach, 772 A.2d 395, 398 (N.J. 2001) (Roach II) (quoting State v. 
Hicks. 255 A.2d 264, 265 (N.J. 1969)). "The fundamental precept of sentencing 
uniformity is that sentencing should not depend on chance or the luck of the judicial 
draw." IdL "Because 'there can be no justice without a predictable degree of uniformity 
in sentencing,'" sentencing judges must consider co-defendants' sentences when 
imposing sentence. WL (quoting State v. Hodge. 471 A.2d 389, 395 (N.J. 1984)). 
This "fundamental precept" does not require co-defendants to receive the same 
sentences. Id Rather, sentencing judges must treat similarly-situated defendants 
similarly, but, have discretion to vary when the circumstances between defendants differ: 
The trial court must determine whether the co-defendant is 
identical or substantially similar to the defendant regarding all 
2 
relevant sentencing criteria. The court should then inquire into 
the basis of the sentences imposed on the other defendant. It 
should further consider the length, terms, and conditions of the 
sentence imposed on the co-defendant. If the co-defendant is 
sufficiently similar, the court must give the sentence imposed on 
the co-defendant substantive weight when sentencing the 
defendant in order to avoid excessive disparity. Sentencing 
based on such added considerations will accommodate the basic 
discretion of a sentencing court to impose a just sentence on the 
individual defendant in accordance with the sentencing 
guidelines while fulfilling the court's responsibility to achieve 
uniform sentencing when that is possible. 
State v. Roach, 680 A.2d 634, 646 (N.J.), cert, denied 519 U.S. 1021 (1996) (Roach I). 
The sentencing judge below failed to give "substantive weight" to the co-
defendant's sentence. IdL The State mischaracterizes the record when it claims that the 
sentencing judge factored Mr. Fuentes' sentence into his decision. State's Brief at 11-13. 
To the contrary, the sentencing judge stated that Mr. Fuentes' sentence was not a proper 
consideration: "I don't know why the co-defendant received the sentence that he did but 
Mr. Sotolongo, it seems to me that a fair sentence for what you did would be the 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the state prison." R. 69: 9. Rather than 
indicating that the sentencing judge considered Mr. Fuentes' sentence of probation, the 
judge's comments reflected his conclusion that the co-defendant's sentence was irrelevant 
to Mr. Sotolongo's sentence. 
The sentencing judge's omission is identical to the sentencing decision in State v. 
Strunk. 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). There, the trial judge knew that the defendant was 
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16 years old at the time he kidnaped, sexually assaulted, and murdered a six-year old girl, 
but the judge failed to consider this fact in setting the mandatory minimum sentence. Id 
at 1298, 1300. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge abused his 
discretion because "being aware of [the defendant's] age and taking it into account are 
not the same thing." Id at 1300. The sentencing judge's failure to consider Mr. Fuentes' 
sentence constitutes an identical abuse of discretion and requires resentencing. 
The State argues that a co-defendant's sentence is not a relevant sentencing 
consideration. State's Brief at 9-11. In support of its argument, the State cites State v. 
Kish, 503 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1972). In doing so, the State conspicuously fails to address 
that Kish amounts to mere dicta that no Utah appellate court has cited it in the 30 plus 
years since it was decided. Nor does the State discuss the apparently opposite view in 
State v. Garcia. 504 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1972). The State further fails to acknowledge the 
circumstances that distinguish those cases from this matter as explained in the opening 
brief. Appellant's Brief at 18-20. Kish simply does not apply to the present controversy. 
The State further mischaracterizes Utah law when it claims that "Utah courts have 
consistently refused to consider the proportionality of sentences between co-defendants." 
State's Brief at 10. To the contrary, no Utah case since Kish and Garcia has addressed 
this issue. Moreover, the Utah cases the State cites in contending that co-defendants' 
sentences are not relevant sentencing considerations have no applicability to this matter. 
State's Brief at 10. Those cases all involve appeals from death sentences and hold that 
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neither the Utah nor the Federal Constitutions require appellate courts to compare the 
death sentence in a particular case with those in other cases. See State v. Lafferty, 2001 
UT 19,1(122, 20 P.2d 342, cert, denied 534 U.S. 1018 (2001); State v. Archuletta. 850 
P.2d 1232, 1249 (Utah 1993); State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 286-87 (Utah 1989), cert, 
denied 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561-62 (Utah 1987). 
This appeal does not raise constitutional proportionality review of death sentences 
on appeal. Rather, it concerns whether the sentencing judge abused his discretion by 
failing to consider "all legally relevant factors" in sentencing Mr. Sotolongo to prison. 
Gibbons. 779 P.2d at 1135. Because the sentencing judge failed to consider Mr. Fuentes' 
sentence and the relative culpability of each defendant, he abused his discretion. 
The State commits further error in arguing that weighing a co-defendant's sentence 
"represents] a minority position." State's Brief at 9 n.4. In addition to the cases cited in 
the opening brief, several other states have held that "'sentencing judges should take into 
account and give substantive weight to the sentence imposed on similar co-defendants.'" 
Roach II. 772 A.2d at 398 (quoting Roach L 680 A.2d at 646); see also People v. Wvatt 
712 N.E.2d 343, 348 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (trial courts cannot arbitrarily and unreasonably 
impose disparate sentences upon similarly-situated co-defendants); State v. Floyd. 830 
So. 2d 384, 391 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (same). Even several of the cases that the State cites, 
either implicitly or expressly, support that "disparity of sentences between co-defendants 
is [] a factor to be considered along with all other appropriate considerations in evaluating 
5 
a contention that a sentence is excessive." State v. Francois. 817 So. 2d 213, 216 (La. Ct. 
App. 2002); see also Carter v. State. 560 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (trial court 
did not abuse discretion in not finding Appellant's lesser culpability a mitigating factor); 
State v. Weir. 600 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Me. 1991) (upholding disparity in sentences between 
co-defendants because Appellant was only co-defendant who committed crime while on 
bail); State v. White. 316 S.E.2d 112, 115 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in imposing disparate sentences); State v. Flores. 637 A.2d 366, 366-67 (R.I. 
1994) (allowing disparity between co-defendants because defendant shot and killed the 
victim). All of these courts appear to have assumed that the defendant's relative 
culpability and a co-defendants' sentence were relevant considerations in sentencing. 
Based on the "fundamental precept of sentencing uniformity," the sentencing judge 
in this case abused his discretion in failing to consider Mr. Fuentes' sentence in sending 
Mr. Sotolongo to prison. Roach II. 772 A.2d at 398. The state concedes that Mr. 
Sotolongo was less culpable than Mr. Fuentes. State's Brief at 11 n.5, 19. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Fuentes received a 365-day jail sentence followed by probation, while the sentencing 
judge below sent Mr. Sotolongo to prison for up to five years. At the very least, the 
sentencing judge was bound to consider Mr. Fuentes' sentence, weigh the relative 
culpability of the actors, and state his reasons for imposing a longer sentence. State v. 
Smith. 864 P.2d 709, 717 (Kan. 1993); State v. Bailey. 834 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Kan. 1992). 
That failure constitutes an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sotolongo requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for a new 
sentencing hearing with instructions to compare Mr. Fuentes' sentence and culpability in 
sentencing Mr. Sotolongo. 
Submitted, this $^_ day of February, 2003. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, KENT R. HART, certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of this 
brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor. P.O. Box 140230, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854, this 3™ day of February, 2003. 
<C$<Ustofa/, 
KENT R. HAR 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of February, 2003. 
